I am an Assistant Professor in Mathematics at London School of Economics. I am interested in Algorithms, Game Theory, and Mechanism Design.

Before joining LSE I was a Senior Researcher at ETH Zürich, an LSE Fellow in Mathematics at London School of Economics, and a Postdoctoral Researcher with Tim Roughgarden at Stanford University and with Éva Tardos at Cornell University. I received my Ph.D. in Computer Science from EPFL under the supervision of Monika Henzinger. During my PhD I did summer internships with David C. Parkes at Harvard University and Radu Jurca at Google Switzerland.

I have recently reviewed for Econometrica, Operations Research, and Games and Economic Behavior. In 2016 I was or will be on the program committees of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’16), the 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT’16), and the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’17).

News

• I am co-organizing a Dagstuhl seminar on “Game Theory Meets Computational Learning Theory” together with Maria-Florina Balcan, Paul Goldberg, Micheal Kearns, and Yishav Mansour. The seminar will take place in June 2017.
• A blog post about my research with Vasilis Gkatzelis and Tim Roughgarden on Spectrum Auctions was featured in the LSE Business Review.
• I gave talks about our new paper Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions co-authored with Felix Fischer and David C. Parkes at Google Research on October 8, 2015 and Facebook Research on October 13, 2015.

Some recent papers

• Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions (abstract only)
  Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, and David C. Parkes
  17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’16, Maastricht, Netherlands
• Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms
  Paul Dütting and Thomas Kesselheim
  16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’15, Portland, OR
• Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round
  Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, and Eva Tardos
  16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’15, Portland, OR
• The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
  Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Tim Roughgarden
  15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’14, Palo Alto, CA
  Full version: Mathematics of Operations Research, to appear
• Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions
  Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’14, Palo Alto, CA
  Full version: Games and Economic Behavior, minor revision
• Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria
  Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, and Eva Tardos
  15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’14, Palo Alto, CA
• Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
  Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, and David C. Parkes
  15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’14, Palo Alto, CA
  Full version: Mathematics of Operations Research, minor revision

Some older papers

• Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers (ACM SIGecom Best Paper Award)
  Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Ben Lubin, and David C. Parkes
  13th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’12, Valencia, Spain
  Full version: ACM TEAC (Invited to Special Issue)
• Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design
  Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, and David C. Parkes
  12th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’11, San Jose, CA
• An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web
  Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, and Ingmar Weber
  20th International World Wide Web Conference, WWW’11, Hyderabad, India
  Full version: ACM TEAC

Click here for full list of publications.