Talks

Talks at conferences and workshops

Invited contributions

  • 09.2018
    Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
    2nd AlgoUK Workshop, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
  • 04.2018
    Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
    Bellairs Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory, Holetown, Barbados
  • 03.2018
    Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
    1st UK Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Mechanism Design, University of Oxford, UK
  • 11.2017
    Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
    Google Zürich Algorithms and Optimization Workshop, Zürich, Switzerland
  • 06.2017
    Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning
    Workshop on Mechanism Design meets Computational Learning Theory, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany
  • 03.2016
    Algorithms against Anarchy
    3rd (German) Day on Computational Game Theory, RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany
  • 12.2015
    Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
    Algorithmic Game Theory Workshop, Hausdorff Center for Mathematics, Bonn, Germany

Refereed contributions

  • 01.2017
    Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
    28th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA’17
  • 06.2016
    Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
    17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’16
  • 06.2016
    Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
    1st Highlights of Algorithms Conference, HALG’16
  • 06.2015
    Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
    16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’15
  • 06.2015
    Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
    15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’14

Talks at industry labs and in research seminars

Industry labs

  • 10.2015
    Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
    Google Research, Mountain View, CA, USA
  • 10.2015
    Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
    Facebook Research, Menlo Park, CA, USA
  • 03.2014
    The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
    Google Research, Mountain View, CA, USA
  • 02.2014
    The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
    Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK
  • 10.2012
    Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
    Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA

Research seminars

  • 03.2017
    Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities
    University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics
  • 02.2017
    Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
    Warwick University, DIMAP Seminar
  • 02.2017
    Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities
    Glasgow University, Department of Economics
  • 04.2016
    Welfare Guarantees for Sequential Posted Pricing
    TU Berlin , Department of Mathematics
  • 03.2016
    Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
    London School of Economics, Department of Mathematics
  • 03.2016
    Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
    ETH Zürich, Department of Computer Science
  • 10.2015
    Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
    University of Zürich, Department of Computer Science
  • 10.2015
    Algorithms against Anarchy
    ETH Zürich, Department of Computer Science
  • 08.2015
    Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
    Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken
  • 02.2015
    Heuristic Mechanism Design
    University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics
  • 01.2015
    Frontiers in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
    Maastricht University, Department of Economics
  • 12.2014
    Frontiers in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
    Hausdorff Center for Mathematics, Bonn
  • 11.2014
    Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
    University of Oxford, Department of Computer Science
  • 11.2014
    Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
    University of Cambridge, Department of Mathematics
  • 06.2014
    Matching Markets with Budgets
    London School of Economics, Department of Mathematics
  • 03.2014
    Payment Rules from Discriminant-Based Classifiers
    Stanford University, Department of Economics
  • 03.2014
    Payment Rules from Discriminant-Based Classifiers
    Caltech, Department of Computer Science
  • 02.2014
    Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
    Stanford University, Department of Computer Science