Talks at conferences and workshops
Invited contributions
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09.2018Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
2nd AlgoUK Workshop, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK -
04.2018Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Bellairs Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory, Holetown, Barbados -
03.2018Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
1st UK Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Mechanism Design, University of Oxford, UK -
11.2017Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Google Zürich Algorithms and Optimization Workshop, Zürich, Switzerland -
06.2017Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning
Workshop on Mechanism Design meets Computational Learning Theory, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany -
03.2016Algorithms against Anarchy
3rd (German) Day on Computational Game Theory, RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany -
12.2015Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
Algorithmic Game Theory Workshop, Hausdorff Center for Mathematics, Bonn, Germany
Refereed contributions
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06.2016Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’16 -
06.2016Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
1st Highlights of Algorithms Conference, HALG’16 -
06.2015Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’15 -
06.2015Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’14
01.2017
Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
28th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA’17
28th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA’17
Talks at industry labs and in research seminars
Industry labs
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10.2015Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
Google Research, Mountain View, CA, USA -
10.2015Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
Facebook Research, Menlo Park, CA, USA -
03.2014The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
Google Research, Mountain View, CA, USA -
02.2014The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK -
10.2012Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
Microsoft Research, New York, NY, USA
Research seminars
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01.2019Prophet Inequalities for Independent Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution
Tel Aviv University, Department of Computer Science -
01.2019Prophet Inequalities for Independent Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution
Technion, Department of Computer Science -
03.2017Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities
University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics -
02.2017Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
Warwick University, DIMAP Seminar -
02.2017Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities
Glasgow University, Department of Economics -
04.2016Welfare Guarantees for Sequential Posted Pricing
TU Berlin , Department of Mathematics -
03.2016Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
London School of Economics, Department of Mathematics -
03.2016Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
ETH Zürich, Department of Computer Science -
10.2015Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
University of Zürich, Department of Computer Science -
10.2015Algorithms against Anarchy
ETH Zürich, Department of Computer Science -
08.2015Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken -
02.2015Heuristic Mechanism Design
University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics -
01.2015Frontiers in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Maastricht University, Department of Economics -
12.2014Frontiers in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Hausdorff Center for Mathematics, Bonn -
11.2014Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
University of Oxford, Department of Computer Science -
11.2014Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round
University of Cambridge, Department of Mathematics -
06.2014Matching Markets with Budgets
London School of Economics, Department of Mathematics -
03.2014Payment Rules from Discriminant-Based Classifiers
Stanford University, Department of Economics -
03.2014Payment Rules from Discriminant-Based Classifiers
Caltech, Department of Computer Science -
02.2014Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Stanford University, Department of Computer Science